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INTRODUCTION TO THE ARBITRATOR AS JUDGE… AND JUDGE OF JURISDICTION
SYMPOSIUM
By
Thomas E. Carbonneau*
In the first several years of its institutional existence, the Yearbook on
Arbitration and Mediation has produced comprehensive annual accounts of
arbitration law. This year's symposium exceeds even the lofty standards of prior
compilations. In addition to the Dean's generous funding, the student editors did a
magnificent job of preparation and organization. Their undertakings were
undergirded by the willingness of outstanding scholars to contribute to the
endeavor. The authors are acknowledged leaders in the field of arbitration. Their
articles are of exceptional quality; as Justice Benjamin Cardozo might have said,
they "betoken" a rigorous and perspicacious analysis of contemporary
developments in U.S. arbitration law. The articles are well-crafted, of substantial
depth, and elegant; they educate and elucidate. Each one of them testifies to
professional excellence.
The symposium originated in a time of anxiety and indeterminacy in the
U.S. law of arbitration. The authors did not benefit from the return to the
familiarity of supportive doctrine supplied by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.
Every article, to some degree and in some fashion, addresses the reasoning and
holding in the recent rulings of the oracle of U.S. arbitration law, the U.S. Supreme
Court. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds portended a reversal of judicial deference to
arbitration and a return to a hostile supervisory posture on the basis of the integrity
of law. A nineteenth century overhang seemed to be creeping into twenty-first
century federal law. A Court that had recently, albeit unsuccessfully, invited lower
courts to eliminate "manifest disregard" concluded that maritime arbitrators
specifically authorized to rule by the parties and having conducted an extensive
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hearing on the matter, exceeded their powers by rendering an award that lacked
any legal basis. The determination not only announced a de facto reversal of the
plurality holding in Bazzle, but also suggested that judicial review and legally
correct results were now the applicable standard in vacatur proceedings. The
subsequent ruling in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson seemed to confirm the substantial
shift in the judicial role in policing arbitral awards under U.S. law. There, the
Court carved out a judicial function in assessing the contractual validity of a
"Kaplan delegation" of jurisdictional authority to the arbitrators to decide
jurisdiction by creating a would-be second separability doctrine. Parties had the
right to expand the adjudicatory authority of arbitrators, but the investiture needed,
at least upon occasion, to be validated by a court of law.
As Professor Park aptly points out, the ruling in Stolt-Nielsen substantially
undermines arbitral finality, an essential feature of an effective and useful arbitral
process. As every modern law of arbitration indicates, the functionality of
arbitration is reduced or eliminated by greater judicial presence in, and authority
over, the arbitral process. Either the arbitral revolution was being quashed by a
counter-revolution initiated by arbitration's principal proponent or Stolt-Nielsen
and Rent-A-Center were, like Volt Information Sciences, Inc., a lapse, a momentary
failure in the Court's sense of doctrinal direction. A great deal depended on the
future course of the law, access to civil justice in the United States and the ability
of international merchants to conduct global trade and commerce. It was as if
arbitral autonomy and arbitrator sovereignty, propounded by Kaplan, Howsam,
and Bazzle, had been discredited overnight and made subordinate to the dictates of
substantive due process under law. It seemed as though the arbitration empire was
in profound decline and collapsing. Judicially-acceptable results became the
watchword of American arbitration law.
Some observers opined that the underlying motive for these atypical
decisions resided with the Court's pro-business bias and its dislike of class
litigation. The latter was a disguised tax on business activities and a block to

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

49

economic efficiency. Class action waivers in arbitration contracts rid the system of
these untoward restrictions. Eradicating class action was a necessary conclusion,
no matter the short-term impact on arbitration. The leftist commentary decried the
Court's suppression of legal rights for the consumer and the immunity afforded to
business interests. A group of well-known and exhaustively analyzed cases
addressed the issue of class action in arbitration. Bazzle centered upon the
permissibility of class action in arbitration under the governing arbitral clause, as
did Stolt-Nielsen and, a bit later, AT&T Mobilty. In the two latter cases, the Court
at least acknowledged the class action dimension of the litigation by stating that
bilateral class action or litigation was radically different from multilateral class
action in terms of time, money, organization, and complexity. In all of these cases,
however, the Court's holding essentially ignored class action and focused upon the
power to regulate the arbitral process. First, arbitrators could interpret the content
of arbitral clauses and determine their meaning and content in the same way they
could construe the main contract. Second, however, the power of interpretation did
not allow arbitrators to find content that simply was not there. They could not
interpret when the arbitral agreement was silent on a particular matter: silence was
silence. It did not become a whisper. The gap or omission of language was
deafening. Arbitrators could not reinvent the protocol for a transaction. Third, state
courts applying a hospitable state statute on arbitration could not elaborate
decisional rules (on class action waiver) that "discriminated" against arbitral
contracts as contracts. The rules' exclusive application to arbitration agreements
rendered them illegal, although the courts were evaluating the contracts on their
own unique terms. Federal preemption applied. In effect, the application and
reaffirmation of federal preemption principles was an indirect means of restraining
the impact of class action on civil litigation.
As Professor Park notes further, the recent cases have divided the Court
along an ideological fault line. Previously, only Volt Information Sciences, Inc.,
among the forty-odd arbitration cases, had that impact upon the Court. Majorities
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were generally neutral and somewhat larger, reflecting Court agreement on the
utility and necessity of arbitration in the American legal process. Dissents were
isolated and circumstantial, limited to addressing a particular juridical issue or
interest. The Court's practice on arbitration had been forged over a half century and
the essential percepts were firmly molded into law: privatization, contract freedom,
federalization, wide arbitrability, and very extensive judicial deference. Politics
and ideological convictions were largely absent from the discussions, reasoning,
and the rulings. Indeed, it would be difficult to see Justice Breyer or Ginsburg, and
former Justices Souter or Stevens as enemies of arbitration, despite their liberal
leanings. At this stage, newly-appointed Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have not
directly addressed the issue of arbitration.
The Court, however, grouped ideologically on the vexed question of class
arbitration and class action waivers. The enforcement of suspect adhesive
arbitration agreements is the most controversial question in modern American
arbitration law. As Professors Schmitz and Stipanowich point out, it has brought
another player, the U.S. Congress, to the decision-making stage on arbitration.
Although its current appearance there seems more powerful and forceful (at least
prior to the last mid-term elections), the Congress has voiced its opposition to the
work of the Court on arbitration for some two decades. It was always a minority
expression. It generally took the form of the Civil Right Protection Procedures Act.
The effort to debase arbitration is rooted in a rights protection argument and now is
described as the Fairness in Arbitration Act. The bill is an ideological 'shotgun"
blast intended to decimate arbitration in disparate-party situations and corporate
America's use of it in those circumstances. It proposes a radical reconstruction of
arbitration's role in American society and reaffirms the hackneyed belief in the
would-be protective virtues of adversarial litigation before courts. In the end, it is a
misguided endeavor that denies American consumers and employees the benefit of
economical, expert, and enforceable adjudication.
Be that as it may, the Court retains its status as the primary provider of
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content to the U.S. law of arbitration. It is unfortunate that the Court divided
ideologically and could not surmount the differences in political allegiance. The
law and society desperately need an example of a dialogue that can be productive
and yield results for the larger public interest. The ideological encampment on the
issue of class action waivers is unbending, partisan, and counterproductive. It
allows both sides to be irresponsible and puerile, to sit on their respective stoops,
hurl insults at each other, and describe their opponents as hateful and corrupt. It is
a practice that has devastated Middle Eastern politics. As Professor Larson
pointedly states, arbitration is, in the final analysis, here to stay. Budget shortfalls
are so significant at both the state and federal levels that maintaining the present
court system will itself be a very difficult challenge. Authorizing new courts to
handle the volume of litigation is literally inconceivable. Therefore, rather than
throwing insults or emasculating arbitration by poisonous legislative proposals, the
goal should be to preserve the availability and effectiveness of arbitration while
being vigilant about its procedural and contractual fairness. The authors of the
symposium have done us the great service of preparing the necessary groundwork
for this grand enterprise of reaching a workable solution.

